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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
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STEVEN R. TODD,
Defendant/Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from a judgment and conviction for pattern of
unlawful activity, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1603(1)
(1990), a 2nd degree felony, and theft by deception, in violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405 (1990), a 3rd degree felony, in the
Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, the Honorable John A. Rokich, Judge, presiding.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 920536-CA
Priority No. 2

STEVEN R. TODD,
Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1992).

STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution
provides:
[Rights of accused.]
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defense.

Rule 11(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure

(1992),1

provided:
(5) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty
or no contest, and may not accept the plea until the
court has found:

x

This rule has since been amended effective May 1, 1993.

(a)
if the defendant is not represented by
counsel, he
has knowingly waived his right to
counsel and does not desire counsel;
(b) the plea is voluntarily made;
(c) the defendant knows he has rights against
compulsory self-incrimination, to a jury trial, and
to confront and cross-examine in open court the
witnesses against him, and that by entering the
plea he waives all of those rights;
(d) the defendant understands the nature and
elements of the offense to which he is entering the
plea; that upon trial the prosecution would have
the burden of proving each of those elements beyond
a reasonable doubt; and that the plea is an
admission of all those elements;
(e)
the defendant knows the minimum and
maximum sentence that may be imposed upon him for
each offense to which a plea is entered, including
the possibility of the imposition of consecutive
sentences;
(f)
if the tendered plea is a result of a
prior plea discussion and plea agreement, and if
so, what agreement has been reached; and
(g)
the defendant has been advised of the
time limits for filing any motion to withdraw a
plea of guilty or no contest.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Does the prosecutor's failure to comply with the

terms of the plea agreement require that Mr. Todd be permitted to
withdraw his pleas?
Standard of review.
that the prosecutor
agreement.

The record incontrovertibly reveals

failed to abide by the terms of the plea

"In reviewing

the

legal

conclusions based

on

the

underlying facts, [appellate courts] apply the correction of error
standard."

State v. Strickling, 844 P. 2d 979, 981

1992) .

2

(Utah App.

2.

Does the ineffective assistance of Mr. Todd's trial

counsel during plea negotiation, entry, and subsequent proceedings
require that Mr. Todd be permitted to withdraw his pleas?
Standard of review.
In order to bring a successful ineffective
assistance of counsel claim pursuant to the Sixth
Amendment, a defendant must show that trial counsel's
performance was deficient in that it "fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness," and that the
deficient performance prejudiced the outcome of the
trial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 104
S.Ct. 2052, 2064 [, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693] (1984) . . . .
See also State v. Templin, 805 P.2d [182,] 186 (Utah
We
1990) (discussing presumption of trial strategy).
will not find deficient performance unless defendant can
show "that counsel's actions were not conscious trial
strategy." State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah
App. 1992). We must therefore be persuaded that there
was a "lack of any conceivable tactical basis" for
counsel's actions before we will reverse a conviction
based on ineffective assistance of counsel.
State v.
Moritzkv, 771 P.2d 688, 692 (Utah App. 1989).
State v. Garrett, 207 Utah Adv. Rep. 45, 46

(Utah App. 1993)

(footnote omitted).

3.

Do the plea affidavit and colloquy fail to comport

with the requirements of Rule 11 and Gibbons, requiring withdrawal
of the pleas?
Standard of review.

"Gibbons mandated that trial courts

strictly comply with the requirements of Rule 11 (5)2 in taking
guilty pleas and held that Rule 11(5) 'squarely places on trial
courts the burden of ensuring that constitutional and Rule [11(5)]

2

In 1989, Rule 11(5) was redesignated 11(e) and minor
organizational changes were made. Effective May 1, 1993 it has
again been redesignated 11(5).
3

requirements are complied with when a guilty plea is entered. ' "
State v. Hoff, 814 P.2d 1119, 1122 (Utah 1991) (quoting State v.
Gibbons. 740 P.2d 1309, 1312 (Utah 1987)).

"Since questions of

constitutional rights are questions of law, we give no deference to
the trial court's conclusion . . . "

State v. Mitchell, 824 P. 2d

469, 471 (Utah App. 1991).

4.
possibility

Does
of

defendant's

incarceration

misapprehension

render

the pleas

concerning

the

involuntary

and

require their withdrawal?
Standard of review.

The trial court's factual findings

are disturbed only if clearly erroneous.
on

underlying

facts

are

reviewed

for

Legal conclusions based
correctness.

State

v.

Stricklinq, 844 P.2d 979, 981 (Utah App. 1992).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Steven Todd was charged with pattern of unlawful activity
and multiple counts of theft by deception.

R. 13-46.

Pursuant to

a plea bargain, he pled guilty to pattern of unlawful activity and
one count of theft by deception.

R. 78-80.

As inducement and part

of the plea bargain, the prosecutor gave John R. Bucher, defense
counsel, a letter indicating that the State would stipulate to
withdrawal of the pleas if the court sentenced Mr. Todd to a prison
term.

R. 123.

This agreement was not disclosed to the court. Mr.

Bucher advised Mr. Todd that the prosecutor's letter guaranteed
that he would not serve time in prison.
4

R. 250-5.

After entry of the plea, Mr. Todd asked Bucher to
withdraw his pleas.

Bucher again indicated the power of the

letter, and did not move to withdraw the pleas.

R. 322-3.

The

thirty day period for a motion to withdraw the pleas expired.
The trial court sentenced Mr. Todd to prison. R. 102-3.
Mr. Bucher disclosed the prosecutor's letter to the court, and
moved for withdrawal of the pleas. R. 109-10. The state, contrary
to agreement, opposed the motion. R. 113-6.

The court denied the

motion, and denied Mr. Todd's petition for certificate of probable
cause.

R. 129-31, 147.
This appeal ensued.

After hearing the petition for

probable cause, this Court on its own motion remanded for findings
on ineffective assistance.
On remand, the trial court allowed withdrawal of the plea
to pattern of unlawful activity due to inadequacies in the plea
affidavit and colloquy with respect to the elements of the offense.
The trial court entered findings.

R. 325-9.

This Court granted Mr. Todd's petition for certificate of
probable cause, and Mr. Todd was released from prison.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On September 11, 1991, Mr. Todd was charged3 in an
information with pattern of unlawful activity in violation of Utah

3

Codefendant Bryant R. Wilson was charge in the same
information with similar (though fewer) counts.
His case is
currently on appeal as no. 920535-CA. The district court record
for both these cases is de facto consolidated.
5

Code Ann. § 76-10-1603(1) (1990), a 2nd degree felony, and 58 counts
of theft by deception in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405
(1990) (variously 2nd and 3rd degree felonies, and class A and B
misdemeanors).

R. 13-46.

These charges stemmed from an auto

brokerage concern called Rocky Mountain Auto Brokers, of which Mr.
Todd was a principal.

R. 29.

Mr. Todd retained the services of

Mr. John R. Bucher, Esq., for his defense.4

R. 73.

On December 30, 1991, Mr. Todd entered pleas of guilty to
a pattern of unlawful activity (Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1603, 2nd
degree felony) and theft by deception (Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405,
3rd degree felony).

R. 71-77 (aff. of Mr. Todd), R. 78-80 (minute

entry), R. 177-92 (transcript of proceedings).
As inducement to enter the plea, prosecutor Greg Skordas
gave trial counsel for Mr. Todd a signed letter agreement which
provided in full:
John,
As further inducement to settle this case, the State
will affirmatively recommend that the defendants be
granted probation & that if they are committed, contrary
to the State's recommendation, to prison, we will
stipulate to a plea withdrawel[sic] on both defendants,
on all counts.
[/s/] Greg Skordas 12/30/91
See R. 3 04 (indicating this letter was submitted as an exhibit at
12/14/92 evidentiary hearing). This letter has been attached as an
exhibit to various prior memoranda (e.g., R. 123) . The original is

4

Although Grant Morrison and Ray Stoddard assisted Mr. Bucher,
the trial court found that Mr. Bucher was the controlling attorney
on the case. See Findings of fact, 1H 2, 3, (R. 325) .
6

unpaginated, but is contained in the court file between R. 12 and
R. 13.

A copy is attached as Addendum A.
Mr. Todd and codefendant Bryant Wilson were instructed by

their trial attorney, John R. Bucher,5 that the prosecutor's letter
agreement to stipulate to withdrawal of the guilty pleas in the
event of a prison sentence precluded the possibility that Mr. Todd
or Mr. Wilson would serve time in prison as a result of the pleas.
R.

250-5.

They were

further instructed not to disclose

agreement to the trial court.

this

R. 253-4.

Mr. Skordas signed the following statement in Mr. Todd's
plea affidavit:
I certify that I am the attorney for the State
of Utah in the case against [handwritten! Steven Todd,
defendant.
I have reviewed this statement of the
defendant and find that the declaration, including the
elements of the offense of the charge (s) and the factual
synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct which
constitutes the offense are true and correct.
No
improper inducements, threats or coercion to encourage a
plea have been offered defendant. The plea negotiations
are fully contained in the statement and in the attached
plea agreement6 or as supplemented on record before the
court7. There is reasonable cause to believe that the
evidence would support the conviction of defendant for
the offense(s) for which the plea(s) is/are entered and
acceptance of the plea(s) would serve the public
interest
/s/ Gregory G. Skordas 73865

5

Bucher has since been suspended for at least six months as of
May 19, 1992. See Utah Bar Journal, Vol. 5 No. 7 (August/September
1992) p. 26.
6

There was no attached plea agreement.

7

There was no supplementation on record before the court.
7

R. 76-77.

Mr. Skordas' statement was incorrect and untruthful.

The existence of the plea withdrawal stipulation letter was not
disclosed to the trial court.
Within a week after the pleas had been entered, Mr. Todd
and Mr. Wilson asked Mr. Bucher to withdraw their pleas.
Bucher refused to do so.
Sentencing,
continued

originally

to

March

investigation.

R. 92.

See Bucher Affidavit, R. 322-3 at 13.
scheduled

9,

Mr.

1992

to

for
allow

January
time

27,

for

a

1992,

was

presentence

On March 9, 1992 Mr. Todd and Mr. Wilson

were each sentenced to concurrent prison terms of one to fifteen
and zero to five years, and were sent directly to prison.
(Todd), R. 105-6 (Wilson).

R. 102-3

On March 30, 1992 Mr. Bucher filed a

motion to withdraw Mr. Todd's guilty pleas.

R. 109-10.

Contrary

to his prior letter agreement, Mr. Skordas opposed this motion
rather

than

stipulating

to

it.

See

State's

Memorandum

in

Opposition, R. 113-116. At hearing on May 18, 1992 (see transcript,
R. 210-217), the court took the matter under advisement.
(Todd), R. 128 (Wilson).
motion.

R. 127

On May 26, 1992 Judge Rokich denied the

R. 129-31.
A notice of appeal for Messrs. Todd and Wilson was filed

June 3, 1992.

R. 132-3.

A separate pro se notice of appeal was

filed June 22, 1992 by Messrs. Todd and Wilson.

R. 136,, The Salt

("LDA") was appointed June 23,

Lake Legal Defender Association
1992.

A motion for certificate of probable cause was filed in
the trial court on June 29, 1992 on Mr. Todd's and Mr. Wilson's
8

behalf by Ray Stoddard.

R. 140.

This matter was heard by the

trial court on August 8, 1992, and Judge Rokich denied the motion.
See transcript, R. 242-6.8
LDA was appointed on August 3, 1992 as appellate counsel.
R. 151.

LDA filed a notice of appeal in the district court on

August 13, 1992. R. 152-3.

Case No. 920412-CA, a duplicate appeal

involving both Mr. Todd and Mr. Wilson, was properly dismissed for
failure to file a docketing statement.

R. 301.

Mr. Todd's Petition for Certificate of Probable Cause in
the Court of Appeals was filed August 20 , 1992, together with the
affidavit of Elizabeth Holbrook9 and a memorandum in support.

A

hearing was scheduled for September 15, 1992, but was vacated due
to a problem with service of the petition.
Todd

and

September

Mr. Wilson
9 and

opposition.

and

supporting

10, 1992.

The

The Petitions for Mr.

materials

State

filed

was

refiled

on

a memorandum

in

A stipulated motion for expedited hearing was denied.

The matters were heard on October 15, 1992.

On this

court's own motion, the matters were remanded to the district court
for entry of findings concerning ineffective assistance of counsel.
R. 299.
An evidentiary hearing and argument was held
district

court on December 14 and 21, 1992

in the

(R. 247-86) .

The

affidavit of John R. Bucher, trial counsel, was entered into the
8

This is a separate transcript. It is also included in the
court file at 289-93, and again at 294-98.
9

Ms. Holbrook has transferred to a trial position within LDA
and current counsel was substituted as appellate counsel in March.
9

record by stipulation.

R. 320-1 (stip.), R. 322-3 (aff.).

The

trial court entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law on
March 5, 1993.

R. 325-329.10

In summary, the court's findings of fact are:

(1)

defendants were charged with Pattern of Unlawful Activity and
multiple counts of Theft by Deception;

(2) & (3) John Bucher was

the controlling attorney for both Mr. Todd and Mr. Wilson;
(5)

(4) &

Greg Skordas was the prosecutor, and executed the letter re:

stipulated withdrawal of pleas if committed to prison;
court was not informed of this agreement;
are knowledgeable, etc.;

(9)

(7) & (8)

the

defendants

one element of Count I was omitted

from the information by the County Attorney's Office;
elements of charged offenses;

(6)

(10-12) re:

(13) defendants stated they had no

questions re: elements of offenses;

(14-16) trial court explained

that there were no promises re: sentence (prison was possible)
without objection;

(17)

knowingly and voluntarily;

trial court found pleas were entered
(18-19) defendants did not request and

pleas were not withdrawn within 3 0 days; and

(20-23)

a hearing

was held on ineffective assistance, Mr. Wilson testified, Mr.
Bucher did not appear11 and Mr. Todd did not testify.12
10

A copy is attached as Addendum B. An additional notice of
appeal was filed from the findings, R. 377 (Case No. 930207-CA).
This appeal has been consolidated into the instant appeal.
xl

But see Affidavit of Bucher, R. 322-3, R. 320-1 (stipulation
to enter affidavit in record).
12

But see the transcript (R. 272:12-17):
THE COURT:
ANY OTHER WITNESSES?
10

In summary, the court's conclusions of law are:
defendants

were

not

credible

witnesses;

(2)

"It

(1)

'belies

credibility' to think that Defendants would not say anything to
either the Court or their counsel when the Court sentenced them to
prison.";13

(3)

there was "no credible evidence presented that

Mr. Bucher was ineffective";

(4)

the court allows plea to Count

I to be withdrawn because of the omission in the Information; and
(5)

court denies defendants' motion to withdraw guilty pleas to

Count II.

footnote

12

(continued)

MS. BOWMAN:
I WOULD PUT MR. TODD ON FOR A
VERY BRIEF OUTLINE OF ABOUT THE SAME THING.
MR. SKORDAS:
I STIPULATE THAT MR. TODD, IF
ASKED THE SAME SERIES OF QUESTIONS, WOULD ANSWER IN THE
EXACT SAME FASHION, IF THAT WILL SAVE TIME.
"But see R. 400-401:
[by defense counsel, Ms. Stam] LAST FRIDAY-FROM THE RECORD [R. 202], THERE WAS A BENCH CONFERENCE
AFTER THE COURT SENTENCED MR. TODD. HE WAS THE FIRST
PERSON TO BE SENTENCED-- I INQUIRED OF BOTH YOU AND MR.
SKORDAS WHAT THAT BENCH CONFERENCE ENTAILED, AND I
BELIEVE THAT THE MEMORY WAS SOMETHING TO DO WITH
CONCURRENT VERSUS CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES.
I HAVE SPOKEN WITH MR. BUCHER TODAY WHO TELLS
ME, AT THE BENCH CONFERENCE, WHICH WAS NOT RECORDED, THAT
WHAT IN FACT OCCURRED WAS THAT HE PRESENTED TO THE COURT
A COPY OF MR. SKORDAS' STIPULATION INDICATING THAT HE HAD
AGREED THAT MR. WILSON AND MR. TODD CAN WITHDRAW THEIR
GUILTY PLEAS, OR STIPULATED THAT THEY COULD. AND HE
WOULD TESTIFY TODAY, YOUR HONOR, UNDER OATH-- AND WE
TENDER HIM TO THE COURT-- THAT THAT IS WHAT OCCURRED.
Judge Rokich remembers it differently, and declined to have Mr.
Bucher testify. R. 401.
11

Judge Rokich allowed withdrawal of Mr. Todd's and Mr.
Wilson's guilty pleas to Count I (racketeering, Utah Code Ann. §
76-10-1603) .

R. 330 (minute entry) .14

Mr. Wilson (and by stipulation, Mr. Todd also) testified
to several matters not contained in the trial courts findings:

14

It is far from clear that Judge Rokich had jurisdiction or
authority to allow withdrawal of pleas while this matter was on
remand for findings on ineffective assistance of counsel. See R.
299 (Court of Appeals order of remand (two sided)) . In any event,
the judge's decision is correct under the facts and law, and should
be affirmed, or vacated and reentered by this Court, as
appropriate.
Of more concern are Judge Rokich's statements concerning
the effect of withdrawal. Both Mr. Todd and Mr. Wilson were given
parole dates based on both the 3rd degree felony and the 2nd degree
felony. Judge Rokich opined that if the 2nd degree felonies were
withdrawn, then the time served on both counts would then only be
credited towards the 3rd. See R. 402-406.
Mr. Todd does not agree. Ms. Stam cited the judge to
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d
656 (1969). The Supreme Court held that upon reconviction after
reversal on appeal, an inmate must be given credit for time served.
Judge Rokich contends that withdrawal of the plea to the 2nd did not
occur "on appeal." R. 406:15-20. This fine distinction is not
well founded in logic or in the law.
Guidance from this court on this issue would be extremely
helpful to the trial court and the parties. Mr. Todd requests that
this Court either:
(1)
find that the trial court was without
jurisdiction to withdraw the pleas while this case was on remand,
and formally reverse and allow the plea's withdrawal in this
proceeding; (2) make a finding that withdrawal of the plea while
on remand from appeal is "reversal on appeal" for purposes of
Pearce and Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-405 (1990) ; or (3) otherwise find
that notions of due process and fundamental fairness require that
Mr. Todd be given credit for time served if he is reconvicted.
In this regard, Mr. Todd should also be given the benefit
of the parole date granted by the parole board. Mr. Todd had a
September 14, 1993 parole date on both charges prior to his release
on certificate of probable cause on May 27, 1993. He thus should
only serve an additional 110 days if his 1 to 15 year sentence^is
reinstated upon reconviction.
In an indeterminate sentencing
scheme such as Utah's, the parole board is the entity that
determines the ultimate severity of the indeterminate sentence
imposed. It is not entitled to increase the severity of Mr. Todd's
actual sentence, once that term has been set.
12

Q.

[by Ms. Bowman] WHAT DID THAT LETTER MEAN

TO YOU?
A.
[Mr. Wilson] IT MEANT TO ME. FROM LOOKING
AT IT-- AND IT WAS SIGNED BY THE PROSECUTING ATTORNEY-REGARDLESS OF WHATEVER HAPPENED AT SENTENCING THAT OUR
ATTORNEY COULD APPROACH THE BENCH-- IS WHAT HE TOLD US-AND SHOW THIS TO THE JUDGE AND THAT OUR PLEA COULD BE
WITHDRAWN AND WE COULD TAKE THE CASE TO TRIAL. THAT WE
WERE GUARANTEED THAT WE WON'T GO TO PRISON OR TO JAIL
BECAUSE OF THAT LETTER. AT THAT TIME, AND WE COULD TAKE
OUR CASE TO TRIAL AND IT COULD GO FROM THERE.
Q.
IF YOU TOOK IT TO TRIAL, YOU UNDERSTOOD
THAT YOU COULD GO TO PRISON IF YOU WERE FOUND GUILTY OF
IT?
A.
YES, MA'AM.
SL.
BUT THIS WAS A GUARANTEE THAT YOU COULD
NOT BE SENT TO PRISON ON A GUILTY PLEA?
A_s_
EXACTLY.
0^. AND WHO TOLD YOU ABOUT THAT GUARANTEE?
&i_ JOHN BUCHER, WHO WAS OUR ATTORNEY AT THE
TIME.
251:3-22 (emphasis added).
THE WITNESS:
JOHN TOLD US NOT TO TELL THE
JUDGE ABOUT THE LETTER. AND THAT WE SHOULD JUST HANG ON
TO THE LETTER UNLESS WE WERE SENT TO PRISON OR JAIL, AND
THEN AT THAT TIME HE WOULD APPROACH THE JUDGE AND SHOW
HIM THE LETTER THAT WE COULD WITHDRAW THE PLEA AT THAT
TIME, WITH THAT LETTER.
Q.
(BY MS. BOWMAN) OKAY. AND WHAT WAS THE
PURPOSE-- AND MAYBE YOU SAID THIS WHEN I WAS PASSING THE
LETTER TO THE JUDGE, BUT WHAT WAS THE PURPOSE THAT YOU
THOUGHT OF NOT SHOWING THIS LETTER TO THE JUDGE?
A.
HE TOLD US NOT TO SHOW THE LETTER TO THE
JUDGE BECAUSE HE FELT THAT IF WE SHOWED THE LETTER TO THE
JUDGE. MR. SKORDAS AND MR. BUCHER, WITH THAT LETTER
OUTSIDE THE COURTROOM, THAT WE'D BE STEPPING ON THE
JUDGE'S FEET: AND THAT WE JUST HAVE THIS LETTER AND THAT
IF WE WERE SENT TO JAIL OR PRISON WE COULD SHOW THEM THE
LETTER AND WITHDRAW IT. HE FELT IT MAY INSULT THE JUDGE
THAT WE WAS TRYING TO NEGOTIATE SOMETHING OUTSIDE THE
COURTROOM.
253:6-11 (emphasis added).
Q.
WOULD YOU HAVE ENTERED THAT PLEA IF YOU
KNEW THAT THAT LETTER WAS NOT A GUARANTEE?
A,. DEFINITELY NOT. I WOULD NEVER HAVE PLED
GUILTY TO A SECOND DEGREE FELONY AND A THIRD DEGREE
FELONY IF I HAD THOUGHT THAT. WE JUST WANTED TO GET IT
ALL WRAPPED UP AND OUT OF THE WAY BECAUSE WE HAD PAID OUR
13

ATTORNEY SO MUCH MONEY, AND EVERYTHING, AND WE JUST
WANTED TO GET IT WRAPPED UP.
Q.
WERE YOU EVER TOLD THAT A JUDGE DOES NOT
HAVE TO WITHDRAW YOUR GUILTY PLEAT?!
A.
HE TOLD US THAT REGARDLESS OF-- HOW HE
PUT IT WAS THE POWER OF THIS LETTER, THE POWER OF THIS-HE SAYS,
"YOU GUYS DO NOT REALIZE THE POWER OF THIS
LETTER." HE GOES. "REGARDLESS OF WHAT MR. ROKICH DOES-JUDGE ROKICH DOES AT SENTENCING, WE CAN APPROACH HIM WITH
THAT LETTER AND WE CAN CHANGE THE PLEA REGARDLESS AND YOU
WON'T GO TO JAIL OR PRISON AT THAT TIME • YOU' LL HAVE THE
OPPORTUNITY TO TAKE IT TO TRIAL."
R. 255:5-23 (emphasis added). Mr. Wilson testified that Mr. Bucher
did not explain the elements of racketeering or theft by deception.
After entering the pleas, Mr. Wilson looked the crimes up in the
library and concluded that he and Mr. Todd were not guilty. He and
Mr. Todd requested that Bucher withdraw the pleas (about 6 to 8
times) , but Bucher wouldn't, saying that the letter protected them.
R. 255-8.

By stipulation, Mr. Todd's testimony would have been to

the same effect.

R. 272:12-17.

Mr. Bucher's affidavit is in accord with the testimony of
Messrs. Todd and Wilson.

It indicates that within a week of entry

of the guilty pleas, both defendants came to his office and asked
that the pleas be withdrawn, but Mr. Bucher "advised the defendants
that the motion was premature and that the motion should not be
filed until the trial court sentenced them."
The trial court made its concerns clear:
THE COURT:
WHAT REALLY CONCERNS ME HERE,
YOU HAD TWO DEFENDANTS WHO ARE NOT THE UNSOPHISTICATED
TYPE OF INDIVIDUALS. THEY WERE BRIGHT ENOUGH TO PUT THIS
BUSINESS TOGETHER. AND I WENT THROUGH THIS TRANSCRIPT
AND WENT THROUGH RULE 11 AND ASKED THEM ON A NUMBER OF
OCCASIONS IF THEY UNDERSTOOD THAT THERE WERE NO PROMISES

14

MADE BY THIS COURT,15 AND THEY DID.
AND IF THEY'RE
GOING TO BE A PARTY TO THIS TYPE OF CONDUCT, THEY ARE
GOING TO PAY THE CONSEQUENCES. AND THE CONSEQUENCES ARE
I'M NOT GOING TO FIND INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
NOR SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT.
AND THEY CAN'T STAND HERE AND TELL ME ONE DAY
THAT THEY UNDERSTAND AND KNOW ALL OF THIS AND I'M NOT
BOUND BY ANY REPRESENTATIONS, AND THEN COME IN AT A LATER
DATE AFTER I SENTENCE THEM AND TELL ME SOMETHING ELSE.
THE JUDGMENT WILL STAND . . .
R.

280:6-22.

The

court

indicated

ineffectiveness of counsel was harmless.

its

opinion

that

any

R. 282:11-13.

After the court entered its findings, an additional
hearing was held on March 8, 1993, at which defense counsel
objected to the court's findings. The following exchange occurred:
[by Ms. Stam] LAST FRIDAY-- FROM THE RECORD,
THERE WAS A BENCH CONFERENCE AFTER THE COURT SENTENCED
MR. TODD. HE WAS THE FIRST PERSON TO BE SENTENCED-- I
INQUIRED OF BOTH YOU AND MR. SKORDAS WHAT THAT BENCH
CONFERENCE ENTAILED, AND I BELIEVE THAT THE MEMORY WAS
SOMETHING TO DO WITH CONCURRENT VERSUS CONSECUTIVE
SENTENCES.
I HAVE SPOKEN WITH MR. BUCHER TODAY WHO TELLS
ME, AT THE BENCH CONFERENCE, WHICH WAS NOT RECORDED, THAT
WHAT IN FACT OCCURRED WAS THAT HE PRESENTED TO THE COURT
A COPY OF MR. SKORDAS' STIPULATION INDICATING THAT HE HAD
AGREED THAT MR. WILSON AND MR. TODD CAN WITHDRAW THEIR
GUILTY PLEAS, OR STIPULATED THAT THEY COULD. AND HE
WOULD TESTIFY TODAY, YOUR HONOR, UNDER OATH-- AND WE
TENDER HIM TO THE COURT-- THAT THAT IS WHAT OCCURRED.
THE COURT:
LOOK, YOU KNOW, I THINK I HAVE
PRETTY WELL MADE MY POSITION CLEAR. I DON'T HAVE ANY
CREDIBILITY FROM ANY OF THE PARTIES INVOLVED IN THIS
CASE. THEY CAN'T COME HERE ONE DAY AND TELL ME ONE THING
AND COME HERE ANOTHER DAY AND TELL ME ANOTHER. JUST
WHATEVER THEY THINK IS APPROPRIATE AT THE TIME. I HAVE
FOUND THAT NONE OF THE PARTIES ARE CREDIBLE SO.
THEREFORE. THEIR TESTIMONY TODAY IS NOT GOING TO CHANGE

15

The colloquy reveals that the court only stated that there
were no promises with respect to sentencing. R. 178, 181. Mr.
Todd is asserting the prosecutor's promise with respect to
withdrawal of the pleas if the court exercised its unfettered
discretion adversely to Mr. Todd.
15

MY OPINION. AND I THINK MY FINDINGS PRETTY WELL SPELL
OUT WHAT TRANSPIRED.
R. 400:16-401:15 (emphasis added).
THE ONLY OTHER THING, YOUR
MS. STAM:
HONOR, IS THE AFFIDAVIT THAT WE PREPARED ON MR. BUCHER'S
TESTIMONY, I WOULD ASK YOU TO CONSIDER ONE MORE TIME IN
TERMS OF HE'S HERE TODAY AND WOULD TESTIFY UNDER OATH
THAT BOTH MR. TODD AND MR. WILSON CAME TO HIM AFTER THEY
ENTERED THEIR PLEA OF GUILTY AND BEFORE THEY WERE
SENTENCED AND ASKED HIM TO ALLOW THEM OR HELP THEM
WITHDRAW THEIR GUILTY PLEAS. AND WE WOULD ASK THE COURT
TO ALLOW HIM TO TESTIFY OR AT LEAST ACCEPT THE AFFIDAVIT.
THE COURT:
WELL. YOU KNOW WHAT? THE FACT-BUT MY PROBLEM IS THEY DON'T HAVE ANY-- THE THREE OF THEM
DON'T HAVE ANY CREDIBILITY SO. THEREFORE. I AM NOT GOING
TO ACCEPT THAT AS BEING A TRUTHFUL STATEMENT. I'M JUST
NOT GOING TO.
HE MAY SIGN THE AFFIDAVIT AND YOU CAN FILE IT
AS SUCH, BUT I MADE MY FINDINGS THAT THEY'RE NOT CREDIBLE
AND I'M GOING TO STAND BY THAT FINDING.
R. 408:13-409:5 (emphasis added).
By order dated May 13, 1993, this Court issued Mr. Todd
a certificate of probable cause, and Mr. Todd was released from
prison.16
Mr. Todd has no significant prior involvement with the
criminal justice system.

While he is a relatively sophisticated

individuals (especially in light of only having completed schooling
through the tenth grade, R. 75) , he has had no prior experience
with criminal law or criminal attorneys.

16

Mr. Todd had served over one year and two months, however,
pursuant to a plea bargain where the State promised and Mr. Todd
believed that there was absolutely no possibility that he would
have to serve time in prison.
16

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Mr. Todd's plea bargain was induced by the prosecutor's
promise that the State would stipulate to withdrawal of the plea if
the court sentenced Mr. Todd to a term of incarceration rather than
probation.

The court in fact sentenced Mr. Todd to incarceration.

The State, contrary to its promise, opposed withdrawal of the pleas
rather than stipulating to withdrawal.

Because Mr. Todd did not

receive the benefit promised in exchange for his pleas, the pleas
must be withdrawn.
Mr.
counsel.

Todd

received

ineffective

assistance

from

his

Mr. Bucher misstated the law concerning withdrawal of

pleas and the effect of the prosecutor's stipulation, failed to
follow Mr. Todd's directions to withdraw his pleas, failed to
extend the time allowed for withdrawal, and withheld information
from the court.
would

not

Absent counsel's deficient performance, Mr. Todd

have

pled

guilty,

and

therefore

could

only

be

incarcerated upon conviction by jury after full trial.
The plea colloquy and affidavit fail to set forth the
terms of the plea agreement, fail to show the necessary mens

rea,

and fail to include all the elements of the pattern of unlawful
activity.

Gibbons requires strict compliance.

Mr. Todd's pleas

must be withdrawn.
Mr. Bucher advised Mr. Todd that there was no possibility
of

incarceration,

because

the

prosecutor's

stipulation

withdrawal of his plea would be binding on the judge.
information, in retrospect, was dead wrong.
17

to
This

As a result of Mr.

Todd's misapprehension concerning the value of his plea bargain,
the plea is not voluntary and must be withdrawn.

ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE PROSECUTOR'S FAILURE TO ABIDE BY
THE TERMS OF THE PLEA AGREEMENT REQUIRES
THAT MR. TODD BE ALLOWED TO WITHDRAW HIS
PLEAS.
The prosecutor's letter agreement17 is properly in the
record, and the trial court specifically found that the prosecutor
executed the agreement. Factual Finding 5 (R. 326) . Nevertheless,
the State opposed Mr. Todd's motion to withdraw the pleas. R. 113116 (State's Memorandum in Opposition).
A prosecutor's failure to keep a plea agreement requires
withdrawal of the plea, as does the accused's entry of a guilty
plea on the basis of a misunderstanding of the value of the
prosecutor's agreement.

State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266, 1274-6

(Utah 1988) ("It is well established that a prosecutor may not make
promises which induce a guilty plea and then refuse to keep those
promises.").

"If the court or the prosecutor refuses to comply

with the terms of the plea [after acceptance] , the defendant may
choose to withdraw the plea.
comply

with

the

terms

of

The trial court may not refuse to
the

accepted

agreement

unless

circumstances justify the declaration of a misplea; otherwise, the
double jeopardy clause will preclude a subsequent trial of the
defendant."

State v. Kav, 717 P.2d 1294, 1304 (Utah 1986).

17

To stipulate to withdrawal of the pleas if the court,
contrary to the State's recommendation, recommends incarceration.
18

United States Supreme Court cases also mandate that Mr.
Todd be allowed to withdraw his plea.

In Santobello v. New York,

404 U.S. 257, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971), defendant was
promised as part of his plea bargain that the State would make no
sentencing

recommendation.

At

recommended a maximum sentence.

sentencing,

a new

prosecutor

Defendant objected.

On appeal,

the Supreme Court reversed:
This phase of the process of criminal justice,
and the adjudicative element inherent in accepting a plea
of guilty, must be attended by safeguards to insure the
defendant what is reasonably due in the circumstances.
Those circumstances will vary, but a constant factor is
that when a plea rests in any significant degree on a
promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be
said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such
promise must be fulfilled.
Id. at 262, 30 L.Ed. 2d at 433 (emphasis added) .
reversed and remanded.18
509, 104 S.Ct. 2543,

The case was

See also Mabrv v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504,
, 81 L.Ed.2d 437, 444 (1984) ("when the

prosecution breaches its promise with respect to an executed plea
agreement, the defendant pleads guilty on a false premise, and
hence his conviction cannot stand").
The

State

is attempting

to

hold

Mr.

Todd

to his

agreement, without upholding its part of the bargain to stipulate
to withdrawal of the guilty pleas if the sentence imposed includes

18

Santobello was remanded for the state court to determine
whether the plea agreement should be specifically enforced, or
whether the plea should be withdrawn. Four dissenting justices
indicated that the plea must be withdrawn as requested. In Mr.
Todd's case, specific performance would be withdrawal of the plea.
19

incarceration.19

This the law will not allow.

Mr. Todd's pleas

must be withdrawn.

POINT II. THE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE MR. TODD
RECEIVED FROM TRIAL COUNSEL REQUIRES THAT
HIS PLEAS BE WITHDRAWN.
A.

DEFICIENT PERFORMANCE

In order to bring a successful ineffective assistance of
counsel claim pursuant to the Sixth Amendment, a defendant must
show that trial counsel's performance was deficient in that it
"fell below an objective standard of reasonableness," and that the
deficient performance prejudiced the outcome of the proceedings.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064
80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693 (1984); see also State v. Templin, 805 P.2d
182,

186

(Utah

1990) .

The

only

Utah

case

law

addressing

ineffective assistance of counsel in plea proceedings is State v.
Ford, 793 P. 2d 397 (Utah 1990) . Ford sets forth the constitutional
right to counsel in plea proceedings, but fails to delineate
specific duties of counsel during the course of plea proceedings.
Under the test of Strickland and Tempiin, Mr. Bucher's
performance

was

deficient

and

prejudicial

in

the

following

particulars:

19

The State alleged (though Mr. Todd disagrees) that Mr. Todd
breached the agreement by not consenting to the State's proposed
restitution. If true, this fact does not help the state. If the
agreement was breached, then it is of no further effect and should
be withdrawn. The agreement stands or falls in its entirety. The
State cannot pick and choose which portions of the agreement should
be enforced, and which should be ignored.
20

(1) Mr. Bucher advised Mr. Todd that he should
not inform the trial court of the State's agreement (to
stipulate to withdrawal);
(2)
Mr. Bucher advised Mr. Todd to enter a
plea agreement based on an undisclosed side agreement
concerning withdrawal of the guilty pleas;
(3) Mr. Bucher failed to withdraw Mr. Todd's
guilty pleas when requested by him to do so;
(4) Mr. Bucher advised Mr. Todd to wait until
after sentencing to move to withdraw his plea, when this
would put Mr. Todd outside the 3 0 day period allowed for
motions to withdraw; 20
(5)
Mr. Bucher failed to seek or obtain an
extension of time for moving to withdrawal Mr. Todd's
guilty pleas, so that he could be sentenced prior to
expiration of the time allowed for moving for withdrawal;
and
(6)
Mr. Bucher advised Mr. Todd that the
prosecutor's stipulation of withdrawal was all that is
necessary, when in fact a showing of good cause is
required. 21
On the whole, Mr. Todd did not receive effective assistance from
his counsel.
why

Mr.

misstated

There is no plausible tactical reason in the world

Bucher
the

should
law,

have

ignored

taken

the

directions

above

actions.

from

his

Bucher

client,

let

statutory time limits expire without advising his client or seeking
extensions, and withheld information from the court. 22
20

See Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(b)

21

See Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2) (a) (1990) .

22

(1990).

Mr. Todd admits that Bucher may have had a bona fide tactical
reason for not informing the court of the plea withdrawal
agreement:
it increased the chances of the plea being accepted.
Nevertheless, this practice is questionable at best (a fraud on the
court at worst) , and should not be encouraged by this Court. Even
if tactical, there is no reason or excuse for Bucher's failure to
advise of the risks inherent. Those risks have become realities,
and Mr. Todd served over a year on a deal which he was told

21

The trial court found that

,f

[t]he Court cannot make a

finding of ineffective counsel because there was no credible
evidence presented that Mr. Bucher was ineffective." This factual
finding is contrary to all the evidence presented.23

The court's

credibility determination is an abuse of discretion, and its
factual finding is clearly erroneous.
The State has stipulated to the existence of the Skordas
letter, and the court found that it was executed by Skordas.

The

existence of this letter raises substantial questions regarding the
adequacy and effectiveness of the representation received by Mr.
Todd. Furthermore, there is no testimony or evidence controverting
the statements of Messrs. Todd, Wilson, and their counsel as to the
representations

and advice given by Mr. Bucher.

Under

the

circumstances, it is an abuse of discretion for the trial court to
completely discredit all three witnesses.
Other jurisdictions would so hold:
It is a well-established rule in Arizona in
civil cases that the trier of fact may not arbitrarily
reject uncontradicted and unimpeached evidence from a
disinterested witness where nothing in the evidence or
the circumstances casts suspicion on it. The rule is
equally applicable to criminal cases. A reviewing court
will scrutinize to determine if there was any justifiable
footnote

22

(continued)

guaranteed that there would be no incarceration.
Bucher also
misstated the law, and told Mr. Todd that the plea withdrawal
stipulation was binding on the judge, when in fact Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-13-6(2) controls (motion must be made in thirty days, and good
cause must be shown).
23

The State did not call any witnesses, nor cross-examine any
witnesses.
All testimony presented was proffered by the
defendants.
22

basis on which the trier of fact could have distrusted
testimony, but where there is none, that testimony cannot
be disregarded even by a jury.
State v. Roberts, 673 P.2d 974 (Ariz. App. 1983).
Mr. Bucher is disinterested.

In this case,

His only relationship is as former

trial counsel for defendants.

In fact, Mr. Bucher may have an

interest in not disclosing facts concerning his ineffectiveness, in
order to protect his own interests.
believed.

His testimony must be

The testimony of Messrs. Wilson, Todd, and Bucher is

consistent, coherent, and uncontradicted, and follows directly from
the existence of the letter.
The trial court found that Mr. Bucher had no credibility
with the court based on some of the precise actions which Mr. Todd
now asserts were deficient:

his failure to disclose the letter

agreement to the court, and his advice to his clients to withhold
information from the court.

Inexplicably, the trial court is

unwilling to extend that deficient, perhaps unprofessional conduct
to

a

determination

that

Mr.

Todd

has

constitutionally adequate representation.

been

deprived

of

The judge's findings

that there was no ineffective assistance, and if there was it was
harmless, are contrary not only to the great weight of the
evidence, but to ALL the evidence.

B.

PREJUDICE

Mr. Todd has been prejudiced.

Had the court been

informed of the State's agreement, the court would either have
accepted the conditional plea, or declined to accept it.
23

Had the

court rejected the conditional plea, then Mr. Todd would be
entitled

to

a

trial

by

constitutional protections.

jury,

together

with

incident

Only upon a verdict of guilty would

Mr. Todd have run the risk of incarceration.
obtained

its

an extension, or moved

to withdraw

Had Mr. Bucher
the pleas when

requested to do so, the motion to withdraw would have been timely.
Had it been accepted, Mr. Todd would not have had to serve time in
prison.

Mr. Bucher's deficient performance has prejudiced Mr.

Todd.
The trial court disagrees:
THE COURT:
STRICKLAND, THE STRICKLAND CASE,
RIGHT.
AND THE OUTCOME WOULD NOT BE ANY DIFFERENT
WHETHER THEY HAD INEFFECTIVE OR EFFECTIVE COUNSEL.
MS. STAM:
YOUR HONOR, THE OUTCOME WOULD BE
ABSOLUTELY DIFFERENT.
THE COURT:
NO IT WOULDN'T.
MS. STAM:
THESE PEOPLE WERE PROMISED THAT
IF THEY PLED GUILTY THEY WOULDN'T GO TO PRISON; THEY
WOULD HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY THEN TO GO TO TRIAL. NOW,
PERHAPS THEY WOULD HAVE BEEN CONVICTED AND WOULD HAVE
GOTTEN PRISON, BUT THAT'S THE OUTCOME THAT WOULD BE
DIFFERENT. THEY WOULD NOT HAVE ENTERED THEIR PLEAS HAD
THEY BEEN TOLD BY THEIR LAWYER AND THE JUDGE AND THE
PROSECUTOR THAT A STIPULATION BY THE PROSECUTION WAS NOT
BINDING, BUT THEY-THE COURT:
DO YOU KNOW WHAT'S STRANGE?
NO, AS I SAID, I'VE HEARD ALL THE ARGUMENT I'M
GOING TO HEAR. JUDGMENT STANDS AND WE'LL GO FROM THERE.
R. 282:11-283:15.
The trial court misapprehends the value of the right to
jury trial.

See Santobello. 404 U.S. at 267

(Marshall, J.

concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("This and other federal
rights may be waived through a guilty plea, but such waivers are
not lightly presumed and, in fact, are viewed with the 'utmost
24

solicitude.'").

Judge Rokich is certainly correct when he states

that he personally would not have accepted a conditional plea.
However, if the guarantee of no incarceration was not in place, Mr.
Todd would not have pled guilty, and incarceration would only be a
possibility upon conviction by jury.

Mr. Todd believed the judge

when he stated he could sentence them to prison. However, Mr. Todd
believed based on advice of counsel that the court would have to
honor the State's stipulation to withdrawal of the pleas if
incarceration were ordered.

Consequently, Mr. Todd believed there

was an absolute, unconditional guarantee in place that he would not
be incarcerated without first going to trial.
In Santos v. Laurie, 433 F.Supp. 195 (D. R.I. 1977)
defense counsel stated to defendant that if defendant did not
receive the recommended sentence, the State had agreed to permit a
withdrawal of the plea.

The court ruled:

Those facts also establish that the conviction was a
product of ineffective assistance of counsel to such an
extent as to render the proceedings a "sham", and to
deprive [defendant] of his right to counsel.
Id. at 198.

The same is true here.

Mr. Bucher was ineffective,

and Mr. Todd's pleas should be withdrawn.

POINT III. THE INADEQUATE PLEA AFFIDAVIT AND
COLLOQUY REQUIRES THAT THE PLEAS BE
WITHDRAWN.
The trial court, on remand, admitted that the affidavit
and colloquy were inadequate with respect to Count I, racketeering,
and allowed Mr. Todd and Mr. Wilson to withdraw their pleas to that
count.

The judge's conclusion is correct, and the plea to Count I
25

must be withdrawn due to failure to properly set forth the elements
of the offense in the information or at the change of plea
proceedings.24
On Count II, the affidavit and colloquy also fail to show
that Mr. Todd understood the elements of the crime to which he pled
guilty.

The affidavit and colloquy further fail to disclose the

terms of the plea agreement, in violation of Rule 11(e) (6) .
Concern for the legitimacy or truth of a guilty plea is
an integral part of ascertaining the voluntariness of
that plea. Utah R.Crim.P. 11(e)(2)25 requires the court
to find that a guilty plea is voluntarily made before it
accepts it. A guilty plea cannot be voluntary if it is
uninformed.
State v. Breckenridae, 688 P.2d 440, 444 (Utah 1983).
In State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1312 (Utah 1987), the Utah
Supreme Court stated that "Rule 11(e) squarely places on trial
courts the burden of ensuring that constitutional and Rule 11(e)
requirements are complied with when a guilty plea is entered."
State v. Maauire, 83 0 P. 2d 216

In

(Utah 1992) the Supreme Court

reaffirmed its
holding that (1) strict compliance with the elements of
rule 11 is required in the taking of guilty pleas and (2)
said compliance may be demonstrated by reference to the
record of the plea proceedings. When plea affidavits are
properly incorporated in the record (as when the trial
judge ascertains in the plea colloquy that the defendant
has read, has understood, and acknowledges all the

24

See also footnote 14, supra, discussing the propriety of
allowing withdrawal while on remand, and the effect of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-3-405 and North Carolina v. Pearce on possible
reconviction.
25
At the time of Mr. Todd's plea, designated 11(5) (b).
Effective May 1, 1993 it was again redesignated 11(e) (2) .
26

information contained therein), they may properly form a
part of the basis for finding rule 11 compliance.
Id. at 217.
In this case, reference to the affidavit does not cure
the inadequate plea colloquy. First, the affidavit is not properly
incorporated into the record.
It is critical, however, that strict Rule 11 compliance
be demonstrated on the record at the time the guilty or
no contest plea is entered. Therefore, if an affidavit
is used to aid Rule 11 compliance, it must be addressed
during the plea hearing. The trial court must conduct an
inquiry to establish that the defendant understands the
affidavit and voluntarily signed it.
State v. Smith, 812 P.2d 470, 477 (Utah App. 1991) (citations
omitted), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992).
More importantly, the affidavit is itself incomplete.
The Skordas letter is not disclosed, and the required intent is not
shown. See State v. Valencia, 776 P.2d 1332, 1335 (Utah App. 1989)
(incomplete affidavit coupled with inquiry only into voluntariness
and

understanding

fails

to

meet

Gibbons

strict

compliance

requirements).
The plea affidavit signed by Steven Todd states:
The elements of the crime (s) of which I am
charged are as follows: [handwritten] as a group there
was direct or indirect participation in an enterprise
that functions through a pattern of unlawful activity.
My conduct, and the conduct of other persons
for which I am criminally liable, that constitutes the
elements of the crime(s) charged are as follows:
[handwritten] I helped participate in a car brokerage
that had as a pattern of activity theft by deception on
customers seeking a car
R. 72. Mr. Wilson's plea affidavit is similar, R. 83. Nothing in
this statement indicat es that Mr-. Todd, had the intent to "obtain[]
27

or exercise[] control over property of another by deception and
with a purpose to deprive him thereof."

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405

(1990).
The plea colloquy likewise fails to show intent:
THE COURT:
AND THE FACTS IN THIS CASE ARE
THAT, MR. TODD, YOU STATE THAT YOU HELPED PARTICIPATE IN
A CAR BROKERAGE THAT HAD A PATTERN OF ACTIVITY THEFT BY
DECEPTION ON CUSTOMERS SEEKING A CAR; IS THAT CORRECT?
THE DEFENDANT TODD:
R. 184:1-6.

YES SIR.

These statements are tautological.

guilty, but did not express the mens

rea

Mr. Todd pled

required by law.

Similar problems exist with respect to disclosure of the
terms of the plea agreement.

See U.R.Cr.P 11(5)(f) (1992).

The

trial court did not inquire as to the terms of the plea agreement,
as required by Rule 11(5) (f) . The fact that the Skordas letter is
not an exhibit and is not discussed in the colloquy or affidavit
shows that the court never inquired into or ascertained the terms
of the actual plea bargain that was reached by the parties.

The

court did address promises concerning sentence, R. 178, 181, but
never stated that there were no promises as to withdrawal of plea
if the sentence he imposed included incarceration.
Mr. Todd's pleas must be withdrawn because the affidavit
and colloquy fail to meet the requirements of Gibbons and Rule
11(5) .

28

POINT

IV.
MISAPPREHENSION CONCERNING THE
POSSIBILITY OF INCARCERATION RENDERS THE
PLEAS INVOLUNTARY, AND REQUIRES THEIR
WITHDRAWAL.

Because the guilty pleas were entered as a result of Mr.
Todd's misinformed belief that he was immune from incarceration,
they are involuntary and should be withdrawn. See, e.g., State v.
Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266, 1275-6 (Utah 1988);
States, 368 U.S. 487, 493, 82 S.Ct. 510,
(1962)

Machibroda v. United
, 7 L.Ed.2d 473, 478

("A guilty plea, if induced by promises or threats which

deprive it of the character of a voluntary act, is void.").
In Machibroda,

petitioner

alleged

that

he

had

been

promised
that he would receive a total prison sentence of not more
than twenty years if he pleaded guilty to both
informations. These promises were said to have been made
upon the authority of the United States Attorney and to
be agreeable to the District Judge. It was alleged that
the petitioner had been cautioned not to tell his own
lawyer about the conversations.
Id. at 489, 82 S.Ct. at

, 7 L.Ed.2d at 476.

This case is quite similar to Machibroda, although the
players' positions are somewhat changed.

Messrs. Todd and Wilson

were promised by the prosecutor's letter that they would not have
to serve time in jail or prison.

In both cases, the judge was not

informed of the details of the promises.

Defendants were sworn to

secrecy (by the US attorney in Machibroda, and by defense counsel
here).
The Supreme Court held:
There will always be marginal cases, and this
case is not far from the line. But the specific and
detailed factual assertions of the petitioner, while
29

improbable, cannot at this juncture be said to be
incredible. If the allegations are true, the petitioner
is clearly entitled to relief.
Id. at 496, 82 S.Ct. at

, 7 L.Ed.2d at 479. See also Tillock v.

State, 711 S.W.2d 203, 205 (Mo. App. 1986) ("Here, the motion court
found that Tillock was misled by his trial counsel when he was told
that he could withdraw his plea if the trial court refused to grant
probation.

It also found, by implication, that such mistaken

advice rendered the plea involuntary, which, in turn, resulted in
manifest injustice when the trial court refused to let Tillock
withdraw his guilty plea.

These findings and conclusions are not

clearly erroneous."; order setting aside guilty plea affirmed).
In this case, Mr. Todd's allegations are not improbable.
The existence of the Skordas letter prove them beyond peradventure
to be true.

Mr. Todd is entitled to relief.

His guilty pleas

should be withdrawn.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Todd's respectfully requests that his guilty pleas be
withdrawn, and this matter be remanded for trial. In addition, Mr.
Todd requests that this Court provide guidance to the parties and
the trial court with respect to credit for time served if Mr. Todd
is subsequently reconvicted on retrial.
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See footnote 14.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 1st day of July, 1993.

ROBERT K. HEINEMAN
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

ELIZABETH A. BOWMAN
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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I, Robert K. Heineman, hereby certify that I have caused
eight copies of the foregoing to be delivered to the Utah Court of
Appeals, 400 Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84102, and four copies to the Attorney General's Office, 236
State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this 1st day of July,
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Robert K. Heineman

DELIVERED/MAILED this 1st day of July, 1993.
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Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
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Plaintiff/Appellee,
•s.

CASE NO.
911901397
Appeal Ho. 920535 CA

STEVEN RICHARD TODD,
Defendant/Appellant..
STATS 07 UTAH,
Plaintiff /Appellee ,

CASE NO*
91190139t£
Appeal No* 920536 CA

BRTAHT R. WILSON,
Defendant/Appellant*

This Court hereby enters its Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law.
1.

Defendants were charged with one count of Pattern of

Unlawful Activity and multiple counts of Theft by Deception.
2.

They were represented by John Bucher, Grant Morrison, and

Ray Stoddard.
3.

John Bucher was the controlling attorney on the case; the

other lawyers were acting at his direction.
4.

Mr. Sfcordas of the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office

represented the State of Utah.
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5.

PAG2 TWO

FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS

Mr. Skordas had prepared a statement wherein he agreed in

behalf of the State to stipulate to a plea withdrawal if defendants
were committed to prison.
6.

Mr. Skordas, Mr. Bucher or the defendants did not apprise

the Court of the agreement.
7.

Defendants are knowledgeable, appeared to be intelligent

and to have sufficient business acumen to operate a car brokerage
firm.
3.

While awaiting sentencing, defendants opened a modeling

agency business which is indicative of their business ability.
9.

The Court read the elements of Count I to the defendants

from the Information, citing Title 76, Chapter 10, Section 1603(1) ,
Utah Code Ann., 1953 as amended, but in the preparation of the
Information by the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office am element
was omitted.
10.

Mr. Skordas and Mr. Bucher concurred that Title 76,

Chapter 10, Section

1603(1), Utah Code Ann., 1953' as amended

constituted the elements of pattern of unlawful activity.
11.

The Court read to the defendants the elements of Count

II, Theft by Deception, from Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 405, Utah
Code Ann., 1953 as amended.

nnQOR

STATE V. TODD AND WILSON

FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS

Mr. Skordas and Mr. Bucher concurred that Title 76,

12.
Chapter

PAGE THREE

6,

Section

405, set forth the elements of Theft by

Deception*
13.

Defendants were asked if they had any question about the

elements of the crime or any part of the proceedings, and their
answer was "no."
14.

The Court explained to the defendants that there have

been no promises made by the Court as to the sentence that would be
imposed upon them.
15.

The

Court

advised

defendants

that

on

the

day

of

sentencing they could be sent directly to prison.
IS.

Defendants nor counsel for the defendants, or for the

State of Utah uttered an objection to the Court's reference to
imprisonment.
17.

The Court found that the defendants had knowingly and

voluntarily entered their pleas of guilty to Counts I and II.
18.

Defendants did not request to withdraw their guilty

pleas•
13.

Defendants failed to withdraw their guilty please within

30 days.
20.

An evidentiary hearing was held on defendant's Motion to

Withdraw their guilty pleas because of ineffective counsel.
21.

Mr. Bucher did not appear as a witness.

nnoo-r
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22.

Defendant

PAGE FOUR

Wilson

testified

FINDINGS 5 CONCLUSIONS

at

the hearing

and

his

testimony was contradictory to his statements made at the time his
plea was taken.
23.

Defendant Todd did not testify.

CONCLUSIONS OP IAW

1.

The Court concluded that the Defendants were not credible

witnesses•
2.

It "belies credibility" to thinJc that Defendants would

not say anything to either the Court or their counsel when the
Court sentenced them to prison.
3.

The Court cannot maJce a finding of ineffective counsel

because there was no credible evidence presented that Mir. Bucher
was ineffective.
4.

The Court will allow Defendants to withdraw their guilty

pleas to Count I because of the omission in the Information , but
not

because

the

guilty

pleas

were

not

made

knowingly

and

voluntarily.
5.

The Court denies defendants' Motion to Withdraw their

guilty pleas to Count II.
Dated this

£

dav of March, 1993.

JOHN A. ROKICH
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing

Findings

following, this

>

of

Fact

and

Conclusions

of

Law,

to

the

day of March, 1993:.

Gregory Skordas
Deputy County Attorney
Attorney for Plaintiff
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Elizabeth A. Bowman
Elizaberh Holhroolc
Attorneys for defendant Todd
424 East S00 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Karen J. Stam
Ronald S. Fujino
Attorneys for defendant Wilson
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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